Cryptanalysis of the Enigma enabled the Allies in World War II to read substantial amounts of secret Morse-coded radio communications of the Axis powers enciphered using Enigma machines. This Allied reading yielded military intelligence which, along with that from other decrypted German radio transmissions, was given the name Ultra .
Enigma cryptanalysis contributed substantially to the success of Allied war efforts—in the Battle of Matapan in March 1941; in reversing the early disastrous course of the Battle of the Atlantic, beginning in the latter part of 1941; in frustrating Rommel's efforts to capture Cairo in 1942; in the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 and of mainland Italy (1943–44); in the planning and execution of Operation Overlord (the Allied invasion of France, 1944); and in the subsequent drive to and through Germany. Evidence suggests that Soviet strategy and tactics against Nazi Germany likewise benefited from Ultra intelligence, conveyed to the Soviets by a variety of conduits.
The Enigma machines were a family of portable cipher machines with rotor-based scramblers. Various German armed and secret services and civilian agencies used Enigma in somewhat different ways, and at various times made changes to their procedures for operating Enigma. The greatest differences in operating procedures were between those of the German Navy (Reichsmarine and Kriegsmarine) and those of other services and agencies.
The German plugboard-equipped Enigma that would be the Third Reich's principal crypto-system was reconstructed, with the aid of French-supplied intelligence material, by the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau in December 1932, on the eve of Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany in January 1933. From then until the outbreak of World War II, the Poles held a monopoly of decryption of this Enigma model.
As war drew near, at a Warsaw conference on 25 July 1939 the Polish Cipher Bureau initiated the French and British into its Enigma-breaking techniques and technology, thus greatly broadening the Allied (Polish, French, and particularly British and American) foundations for wartime decryption of German Enigma-enciphered communications.
Analysis of a monoalphabetic substitution cipher is relatively easy, provided that a message is long enough to give a reasonably representative count of the letters of the alphabet that it contains. The resultant frequency count can then be compared with the known letter frequencies of the language in which the message is written.
A polyalphabetic substitution cipher is more complicated and for some three centuries the Vigenère cipher was considered to be completely secure ( le chiffre indéchiffrable —"the indecipherable cipher"). The cryptographic key for the Vigenère cipher consists of a word or phrase that is repeated many times to cover the length of the message.
During World War I, inventors in several countries realized that a purely random key sequence, containing no repetitive pattern, would make a polyalphabetic substitution cipher, in principle, unbreakable. This led to the development, in several countries, of rotor cipher machines such as Arthur Scherbius' Enigma.
Rotor cipher machines alter each character in the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, by means of a scrambler comprising a set of rotors (or wheels ) that alter the electrical path from character to character, between the input device (in Enigma, a keyboard) and the output device (in Enigma, a lampboard). This constant altering of the electrical pathway produces a very long period before the pattern—the key sequence or substitution alphabet—repeats.
Deciphering a message of this sort involves three stages. Firstly, the is the identification of the system in use, in this case Enigma. Secondly, breaking the system by establishing exactly how encryption takes place, and thirdly, setting , which involves finding the way that the machine was set up for an individual message, i.e. the message key .
Although Kerckhoffs' principle states that a cryptosystem should be secure even when everything about the system except the key is known to the enemy, the internal wiring of machines such as Enigma has so many possibilities, that an important aspect of breaking them, is to get to know their logical structure.
The Enigma was potentially an excellent system. It was designed to defeat cryptanalytic techniques by continually changing the substitution alphabet through the use of a scrambler comprising three—or in some cases, four—rotors. Like other rotor cipher-machines, Enigma generated a polyalphabetic substitution cipher with a period before repetition, that was much longer than any message or set of messages sent with the same key.
The mechanism of the Enigma consisted of a keyboard connected to a current entry plate or wheel (German: Eintrittswalze ), at the right hand end of the scrambler (usually via a plugboard in the military versions). This contained a set of 26 contacts that made electrical connection with the set of 26 spring-loaded pins on the right hand rotor. The left hand side of each rotor in turn made electrical connection with the rotor to its left, and in the case of the leftmost, with the reflector (German: Umkehrwalze ). The reflector provided a set of thirteen paired connections to return the current back through the scrambler rotors, and eventually to the lampboard.
There are a huge number of ways that the connections within each scrambler rotor—and between the entry plate and the keyboard or plugboard or lampboard—can be arranged. For the reflector plate there are fewer, but still a large number of options to its possible wirings.
Whenever a key on the keyboard was pressed, the stepping motion was actuated, moving the rightmost rotor on one position. Because it advanced with each key pressed it is sometimes called the 'fast' rotor. When the notch on that rotor engaged with a pawl on the middle rotor, that too moved; and similarly with the leftmost ('slow') rotor.
Each scrambler rotor could be set to any one of its 26 starting positions (any letter of the alphabet). For the Enigma machines with only three rotors, their sequence in the scrambler—which was known as the wheel order (WO) to Allied cryptanalysts—could be selected from the six that are possible.
Later Enigma models included an alphabet ring like a tyre around the core of each rotor. This could be set in any one of 26 positions in relation to the rotor's core. The ring contained one or more notches that engaged with a pawl that advanced the next rotor to the left.
Later still, the three rotors for the scrambler were selected from a set of five or, in the case of the German Navy, eight rotors. The alphabet rings of rotors VI, VII and VIII contained two notches which, despite shortening the period of the key, made decryption more difficult.
Most military Enigmas also featured a plugboard (German: Steckerbrett ). This altered the electrical pathway between the keyboard and the entry wheel of the scrambler and, in the opposite direction, between the scrambler and the lampboard. It did this by exchanging letters reciprocally, so that if A was plugged to G then pressing key A would lead to current entering the scrambler at the G position, and if G was pressed the current would enter at A . The same connections applied for the current on the way out to the lamp panel. With six plugboard leads, the number of different ways that letters could be re-arranged was some 100 billion.
For an enemy to decipher German military Enigma messages required that the following were known.
The machine featured the major operational convenience of being symmetrical (or self-inverse). This meant that decipherment worked in the same way as encipherment, so that when the ciphertext was typed in, the sequence of lamps that lit yielded the plaintext. This of course required that the deciphering machine's plugboard and scrambler rotors had been set identically to those of the enciphering machine. This was achieved by a combination of transmitting an indicator with the message, and setting sheets in a codebook . These were distributed to all users of a network
These sheets changed the settings regularly (at first monthly or weekly, but soon daily and even, toward war's end in some networks, several times a day). The setting sheets had columns specifying, for each date, the rotors to be used and their positions, the ring positions and the plugboard connections. The dates were in reverse chronological order down the page. Each row was cut off and destroyed when it was finished with, so that, in the event of capture, previous keys would not be revealed.
Lastly, for each message, the transmitting operator would send the message key (the key specific to that message) so that the receiving operator could align his rotors identically. This is called the indicator for that message and determined the initial letters that would be visible through
Cash Register Group >Downloads ... Olympia instruction manual ... Royal
Royal 480 NT cash register instruction manual to download.Completely free of charge.
Royal Alpha 585cx Instruction Manual ... your Royal 585cx cash register with this all in one manual This Royal cash register ...
Royal cash register manuals from Cash Registers Online ... Royal Alpha 585cx Instruction Manual (585cx Manual)
i need instruction manual tec ma 305 cash register? it needs to be ... I need help locating a manual or instructions on how to reprogram a used cash register. It is a Royal cms ...
Cash Register Group >Downloads >Royal ... Royal 325 CX Instruction Manual
Royal Cash Register Manuals This page is the showroom for Royal Cash Register ... Royal Alpha 600sc Instruction Manual (600sc Manual)
For which make of cash register do you require an instruction manual ? Aster; Casio; Metrologic; NCR class 96; Olivetti; Omron; Royal; Sanyo; Samsung; Sharp
Royal Cash Register Manuals This page is the showroom for Royal Cash Register ... Royal Alpha 600sc Instruction Manual (600sc Manual)
Cash register instruction manual and software database. ... Is your manual not making sense ? We provide other services to assist you use your cash register, such as training and ...